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THE EVOLUTION OF CANADA'S TAX

TREATY POLICY SINCE THE ROYAL
COMMISSION ON TAXATION*
By Alexander . Easson**

I. INTRODUCTION
Probably the least innovative and stimulating part of the
Carter Commission Report is that dealing with international taxation.
Re-reading the Report twenty years on, one is left with the
impression that, except insofar as international factors impinged upon
the overall grand design - especially where they raised questions of
equity between different classes of Canadian taxpayers - the
Commission was not really interested. The major object of the
Commission was to achieve tax neutrality;1 since, in the international
sphere, it concluded that "perfect tax neutrality is neither
administratively feasible nor necessarily economically desirable,"2 the
Commission seems to have contented itself with making a few
specific recommendations dealing with the extraterritorial aspects of
its main domestic proposals before passing on to matters of greater
moment. The section of the chapter dealing with tax treaties is

O
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'Canada, Royal Commission on Taxation, Repor vol. 4 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966)
(Chair. K.LeM. Carter) at 481 [hereinafter Report].
2
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especially disappointing. 3 Apart from concluding that tax treaties are
a good thing, especially insofar as they assist in countering tax
avoidance and evasion, and that Canada should have more of them,
it really has very little to say about the subject.
Nevertheless, the Royal Commission's Report - or at any rate
those parts of it that ultimately came to be implemented - did have
a substantial impact upon Canada's tax treaty policy. The aim of
this paper is to trace the subsequent evolution of that policy, to
identify the major factors that have determined or influenced that
evolution, and to suggest the directions which that policy might take
in the years to come.
Canada's first tax treaty was entered into in 1928, with the
United States of America, and was of a limited nature, concerned as
it was only with the taxation of shipping profits. 4 A number of
other such agreements, restricted to shipping and transportation or,
in the case of the 1935 agreement with the United Kingdom, to
agency profits, were entered into in the period before the Second
World War.5 Canada's first income tax agreement of general scope
was that with the United States, entered into in 1942. This was
followed, in 1946, by the agreement with the United Kingdom, which
extended to a number of the then British colonies. By the time of
the Royal Commission Report 6in 1966, Canada had concluded a total
of fifteen income tax treaties.
Compared with the situation twenty years later, this may
seem a rather small total. Indeed, to some commentators it
appeared inadequate at that time. Certainly it did to one of

3

1bid. c. 26 at 566-70.

4

E.H. Smith, "Making Canada's Tax Treaties" (1962) 10 Can. Tax J. 289 at 294.

5

For reviews of Canada's earliest tax treaties and of the agreement with the United
Kingdom, see R.D. Brown, "Canada's Expanding Tax Treaty Network and the Channelling of
International Investments" (1977) 25 Can. Tax J. 637; R.A. Short, "The Comprehensive
Canada-UK Tax Agreement" (1967) 15 Can. Tax J. 37.
6
At the time of writing of the Report, thirteen treaties were in force and a further three
were awaiting ratification. Two of these three were ratified before the end of 1966. The

other, with Belgium, was substantially modified and did not receive ratification until 1975. A

number of estate and succession duty treaties had also been concluded.
considered further in this paper.

These are not
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Canada's pioneers in the field of international taxation who, speaking
at the Tax Foundation Conference in 1970, held Canada's "puny
participation" in bilateral tax treaties up to ridicule.7 Nevertheless, it
is important to remember that the countries covered by tax treaties
included the United States (and this is undoubtedly the most
important single tax treaty in the world in terms of the volume of
income flows that it affects), the United Kingdom, several other
European countries (including the Federal Republic of Germany,
France and the Netherlands), Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.
In other words, a good three-quarters of income flowing into and
out of Canada was
already subject, by 1966, to one or another of
8
our tax treaties.
Of more concern than the number of Canada's treaties was
their vintage, a matter scarcely commented on at all by the Royal
Commission. 9 The treaty with the United States had been modified
four times since 1942, and the one with France was almost twenty
years old and did not take into account the major French reforms
of 1965. The United Kingdom treaty had been terminated in 1965
and replaced in the following year by a new one, excluding from its
scope the various colonies that had been covered by the 1946 agreement. Prior to its replacement, it had been hopelessly out of date
and lopsided. 10
It was fairly obvious, then, at the time of the Royal
Commission's Report, that Canada's tax treaty network would have
to be expanded and brought up to date. What happened in fact,

7

A.B. McKie, "Canada's Tax Treaties" in Proceedingsof the 22nd Tax Conference -- 1970
(Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1970) 292.
8

.DJ.S. Brean, International Issues in Taation: The Canadian Perspective (Toronto:
Canadian Tax Foundation, 1984) c. 5.
9

The Report did call for keeping existing treaties under review and up to date: supra,
note 1 at 577. See, however, the comments of McKie, supra, note 7 at 292-93.
10

McKie, ibid at 293.
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however, was that nothing happened." It was not until 1975 that
Canada entered into another tax treaty. The reasons for this
inaction are not difficult to find. First, there was the uncertainty
surrounding the Report of the Royal Commission itself. Which of its
numerous recommendations would eventually be implemented?
Canada's own tax administrators were largely preoccupied with
domestic reform, as the Commission itself had been.
Other
countries were in no hurry to enter into negotiations with Canada,
knowing that major changes were shortly to be adopted, but
uncertain what those changes might be. Consequently, nothing could
be done; indeed no real start could be made toward drawing up a
comprehensive tax treaty program until after the tax reform package
of 1971 was announced. At that time it was sanguinely expected
that a new treaty network
would be in place by 1974;12 in reality,
13
things took much longer.
Since 1974, however, the situation has changed dramatically.
By the end of 1986, tax treaties with some forty-nine countries had
been signed and were either in force or awaiting ratification.1 4 Of
at least equal importance is the fact that only five of the pre-1967
treaties still remain in force today.ls With these exceptions, and that
1

1See the comments of R.A. Short, "Tax Treaties - Recent Developments" in Proceedings
of the 21st Tar Conference - 1968 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1969) 414, who
stated, "If this paper were restricted to recent developments in Canada's tax treaty
arrangements, I could conclude my assignment quite simply by sitting down," ibid. at 414.
12See TJ. Kennedy, 'The Canadian White Paper. International Tax Planning" [1970] 24
Bull. for Int'l Fisc. Doc. 54 at 113.

13 Sce the comments by A.R. Short and by H.D. Rosenbloom, 'The Canada - U.S.A.
Income Tax Treaty-I" in Proceedingsof the 32nd Tar Conference - 1980 (Toronto: Canadian
Tax Foundation, 1981) 350, 371.

14 j.S. Peterson, writing in 1975, lists thirty-eight countries with which Canada intended
to negotiate or renegotiate treaties: "Canada's New Tax Treaties" (1975) 23 Can. Tax J. 315
at 317-18. In all but three cases this has been done: Mexico, Portugal, and Senegal. A

number of treaties have also been concluded with countries not on his list, notably Romania,
the USSR, and the People's Republic of China.
15

With Denmark (1955), Finland (1959), Ireland, Norway, and Trinidad and Tobago.
These last three were all concluded in 1966 and were, consequently, based upon tile Draft
Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital (Paris: OECD, 1963) [hereinafter 1963

Model]. (Only in these five treaties, by the way, is the exemption for visiting teachers and

1988]

Evolution

of the treaty with South Africa, which was terminated for essentially
political reasons in 1986, all the treaties existing at the time of the
Royal Commission Report have been replaced. In addition to
expanding its treaty network with most of its fellow members of the
OECD, Canada has concluded treaties with a considerable number of
developing countries 16 and with three socialist countries.
The next Parts of this paper will attempt to review the major
features of Canada's tax treaty policy and to examine the most
important influences thereon.
II. THE REPERCUSSIONS OF DOMESTIC REFORM
Of the changes made in Canada's domestic tax system as part
of the 1971 reforms, and thus directly or indirectly attributable to
the Royal Commission Report, four in particular had an important
impact upon Canada's tax treaties.
A. The Foreign Affiliate Rules
Prior to the 1971 reforms, dividends received by Canadian
corporations from foreign affiliated corporations were received taxfree by virtue of what was then section 28(1)(d) of the Income Tax
Act. Concern was expressed by the Commission that this rule
provided opportunities for tax avoidance on a large scale by the use
of subsidiaries established in tax haven countries. 17 The new system,
introduced in 1971 (though it did not take effect until 1974), made
18
a distinction between dividends received from treaty countries,
which it was assumed would normally have been taxed at rates not
radically different from those imposed in Canada, and which

professors still to be found.)
16

Some twenty to thirty countries seem to fit this category.

17Report, supra, note 1 at 486.
18
Actually, from those countries listed in Reg. 5407(11) of the Income Tax Regulations,
C.R.C., c. 945. The list includes the countries with which Canada has concluded tax treaties.
See further D.A. Ward, Taration of Income of Foreign Affiliates (Toronto: Carswell, 1983).
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consequently need not be taxed again (exempt suiplus), and those
received from non-treaty countries, which included the most popular
tax haven countries, which in future were to be taxable (taxable
suiphs) subject to credit for any source-country tax actually paid.1 9
These reforms made it very desirable for Canadian corporations with
foreign subsidiaries, and for countries seeking to attract Canadian
investment, that there be an applicable tax treaty. Exemption avoids
the sometimes hideously complex foreign tax credit computations
and, where the tax burden in the other country is lower than that in
Canada, there will be a reduction, or at least a deferral, of tax paid.
B. Withholding Taxes
One of the most important recommendations of the
Commission concerning the international aspects of Canada's tax
system was that there should be an increase in the rates of
withholding tax levied on certain types of income, in particular
dividends, interest, and royalties, paid from Canadian sources to nonresidents. 20 The prescribed rate at that time was generally 15
percent - relatively low by international standards. 2 1 The Royal
Commission felt that foreign investors were not contributing
sufficiently to Canada's economy, and that the main beneficiaries of

the low rates were foreign governments. 22 Yet the actual increase,
to 25 percent, which was introduced in 1971, probably had relatively

little impact upon either the Canadian or foreign treasuries since, as
previously remarked, 75 percent or more of income flowing out of
Canada was destined for countries with which Canada had a tax
treaty. Invariably the treaty would stipulate the maximum rate of tax
to be withheld (commonly 15 percent) and, in consequence, the new
19

Including the underlying corporate tax: Income TaxAct, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, ss 90, 113.

20

The Commission recommended a standard rate of 30 percent: Report, supra, note 1

at 488.
21

The corresponding rates in the United Kingdom at that time were from 40 to 47

percent: see McKie, supra, note 7 at 293.
22
Since the lower the Canadian rate, the lower the amount of foreign tax credit given by
the other country.
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increased rate did not apply. It did, however, have an important
impact upon Canada's subsequent tax treaty policy and its relations
with those countries with which it had not yet concluded a tax
treaty.
Hitherto, there had been little real pressure upon Canada to
negotiate tax treaties. Canadians receiving foreign-source income
benefited from a relatively generous foreign tax credit system, and
so were not overly concerned about negotiating reductions in foreign
tax rates unless these were especially high.2 3 Most of Canada's
early tax treaty negotiations, in fact, seem to have been initiated by
the other country. But as Canada's standard 15 percent rate of
withholding tax was no higher than the rate specified in most
treaties, there was no great advantage to be gained by foreign
investors from a treaty with Canada, insofar as withholding tax was
concerned.
Increasing the rate to 25 percent made it more important for
foreign investors to have the benefit of a tax treaty with Canada,
and at the same time improved Canada's bargaining position. 24 The
previous standard rate, available to all foreign investors, became the
new concessionary rate to be bestowed only on treaty partners. In
fact, the 15 percent rate became a firm negotiating position 25 and
Canada generally declined to accept rates lower than that.26 Indeed
Canada appeared to be moving in the opposite direction from most
other countries, increasing its withholding tax rates at a time when
others were reducing theirs.

23As they were, for example, in the United Kingdom. See J.F. Harmer, "Canada's Income
Tax Treaties" in Proceedings of the 12th Tar Conference - 1958 (Toronto: Canadian Tax
Foundation, 1959) 222 at 233; Smith, supra, note 4 at 291; McKie, supra, note 7 at 293.
24

See Brown, supra, note 5.

25

Peterson referred to it as a "sacred cow": supra, note 14 at 320. There has been some
softening in this position recently. Royalties are frequently reduced to 10 percent. The new

Canada-United States treaty reduces the rate for intra-affiliate dividends to 10 percent and
this has been followed in the 1987 protocol with France and the recent (1986) treaties with
Japan, the Netherlands, and China. Withholding tax rates on interest payments have also been
reduced in some of Canada's recent treaties, notably those with China and Japan.
26

See infra, notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
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C. Capital Gains
The introduction of a tax on capital gains also compelled
Canada to examine its existing treaties and to formulate a
negotiating position with respect to future treaties. At the time of
the Royal Commission Report, taxation of capital gains,
internationally, was probably the exception rather than the rule. The
United States had for many years included capital gains in the
definition of income, but the u.K. Capital Gains Tax was introduced
only in 1965, and many other countries either excluded capital gains
from tax entirely or taxed only certain types of gain. This diversity
was reflected in Canada's tax treaties, 27 in that only six of them
contained specific provisions dealing with capital gains. These six,
in turn, reflected a variety of positions, which is scarcely surprising
since the provisions had presumably been designed principally to
meet the needs of Canada's treaty partners and could have had little
or no importance to Canada's negotiators. The treaties with Finland,
the Federal Republic of Germany, 28 the United Kingdom, and the
United States contained a restricted right to tax in the source
country; those with the Netherlands and Sweden generally exempted
the gains of non-residents. In the case of the other treaties, which
contained no specific provision dealing with capital gains, there was
also some confusion, since Canada's right to impose the new tax
upon residents of those states depended upon the general wording
of the treaty in question.
Tax reform radically altered Canada's international position.
From being a country that did not tax capital gains and whose
interest, insofar as it had displayed any, was to minimize capital gains
taxation at source so as to protect its own residents from a tax that
it did not impose on residents of other countries, Canada became a

27

See A.P.F. Cumyn, "Canada's Future Tax Treaties" in Proceedings of the 24th Tar
Conference -1972 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1973) 117; D.G. Broadhurst, "Income
Tax Treaties" (1978) 26 Can. Tax J. 322.
28
The treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, exempted gains on
shares in corporations holding real estate. The new treaty extends Canada's right to tax
capital gains: see S.S. Krishna, "The Canada-West Germany Tax Treaty: Issues, Concerns,
and Tax Planning Techniques" (1986) 34 Can. Tax J.413.
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country with a relatively comprehensive tax on gains, 29 asserting an

unusually wide jurisdiction to tax the gains of non-residents. In
consequence, Canada's negotiating position also changed and it now
sought to
protect, so far as possible, its right to tax gains arising in
30
Canada.
D. Coiporate Taxation
One of the most interesting and radical recommendations of
the Royal Commission was the complete integration of corporate
and personal income taxes, whereby shareholders would receive full
credit for the tax paid by the corporation in respect of dividends
received by them. Until 1949, Canada had applied the 'classical
system' to corporations, taxing a corporation on its profits and the
shareholder on his or her dividends, with no recognition of the fact
that those dividends had been paid from after-tax profits. 3 In 1949,
a tax credit of 10 percent of the dividend 32 received was introduced,
though it was restricted to Canadian resident shareholders of taxable
Canadian corporations. The credit, apparently, had a dual motive:
to give some measure of relief from the effects of 'economic double
taxation', and to encourage investment by Canadians in Canadian
equities. The 1971 reforms, predictably, did not go as far as the
Commission had advocated, yet nevertheless substantially increased
the degree of integration between corporation and shareholder by

29The "deemed disposition" provisions on death and on emigration, in particular, posed
See D.R. Tillinghast, "Canadian Tax Reform and
problems for treaty negotiation.
International Double Taxation: A View from the United States" (1973) 21 Can. Tax J. 472
at 484; Cumyn, supra, note 27 at 117-19.
30

This is reflected in the reservation expressed to art. 13 of the OECD 1977 model

treaty. Model Double Taation Convention on Income and Capital (Paris: OECD, 1977)
[hereinafter 1977 Model]. See text accompanying note 68; and see Broadhurst, supra, note

27.
31
For a brief account of the evolution of Canadian taxation of corporations, see D.K.
McNair, in B.G. Hansen, V. Krishna & J.A. Rendall, eds., Canadian Taxation (Toronto: R.
De Boo, 1981) c. 14.
32

Increased to 20 percent in 1953.
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raising the level of the dividend tax credit. As before, the credit was
restricted to Canadian residents.
Arguably, then, the tax reforms had not brought about any
fundamental change. Ever since 1949 Canada had operated a system
of 'partial integration', and had never extended its tax credit to nonresident investors in Canadian corporations. Nevertheless, Canada
had moved, in a series of steps and, one might say, almost by stealth,
from a 'classical' system like that employed by the United States to
an 'integration', or 'imputation', system similar in many respects to
those that had recently been introduced, or were about to be
introduced, in France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United
Kingdom and other members of the European Community. 33 In so
doing, it stepped right into the thick of an international row.
The origins of the dispute seem to date from the mid-1960s,
when France revised its corporate tax system, introducing the
prcompte (the effect of which is somewhat similar to Canada's
dividend tax credit), at the same time as its tax treaty with the
United States was being renegotiated 4 There was, to say the least,
a suspicion in the United States that the adoption of the new system
by France had been a deliberate act to improve the French
bargaining position and to secure an increased share, for the French
treasury, of the profits accruing to U.S.investment in France. Nor
was this suspicion confined to American commentators. As one
British parliamentarian remarked: "The imputation 's35stem was
invented by the French to be beastly to the Americans. 7

33

For a description of the movement to harmonize corporation tax systems in the EEC,
see A.J. Easson, Tav Law and Policy in the EEC (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1980) c. 3.
34
For a comprehensive review of the entire issue, see C.I. Kingson, 'The Coherence of
International Taxation' (1981) 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1151 at 1194ff. See also H.D. Rosenbloom
& S.I. Langbein, "United States Tax Treaty Policy: An Overview" (1981) 19 Colum. J.
Transnat'l L. 359; J.Rosenzweig, "United States International Tax Treaty Policy with respect
to Foreign Imputation Systems of Corporate-Shareholder Taxation" (1981) 13 N.Y.U. J.Int'l
L. & Pol. 729.
35

Denzil Davies, M.P., quoted by Kingson, supra, note 34 at 1194. There would seem
to be an element of truth in this. Certainly, in choosing the most appropriate harmonized
corporation tax system for the EEC, the Van den Tempel report was strongly influenced by
the effect upon bargaining positions: see Easson, supra, note 33 at 176.
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At this point, a few words of explanation may be appropriate.
As already observed, under the so-called classical system as applied
in the United States and, until 1949, in Canada, a corporation is

taxed on its profits and the shareholders are separately taxed on
dividends, which are paid out of after-tax profits. There is,
consequently, an element of economic double taxation. Suppose, for
example, that corporations are taxed at a flat rate of 40 percent, and
that individual shareholders pay tax at 50 percent. A corporation
earning a profit of 100 will pay 40 in tax: if it distributes the
remaining 60 by way of dividend, the shareholder will pay a further
30 tax, making a total tax burden of 70.
By contrast, the essence of integration or imputation systems
consists in the recognition that the tax paid by the corporation, or,
more usually, some part of that tax, should be regarded as a having
been imposed upon the shareholders and that, when taxed upon
their dividends, the shareholders should receive some credit for the
tax already paid by the corporation. Assuming that individual tax
rates remain unchanged, then in order for the state to secure the
same tax revenue from distributed profits 36 the corporate tax rate
must be greater under an integration or imputation system to
compensate for the credit given to the shareholder. For example,
if shareholders received a tax credit of 10 percent of the dividend
received, the corporate tax rate would have to be increased from
40 percent to 50 percent in order to yield the same amount of tax
revenue. 38 The greater the credit, the higher the corporate tax rate.
None of this matters very much so far as domestic investors
are concerned: it is the total tax take, or the net amount of the
distribution, that matters and it is of no great consequence whether
the exchequer devours its tax in one bite, two bites, or one-and-abit. But in an international context the choice of system is

36It will be seen that the classical system taxes undistributed profits only once, and thus
discriminates in favour of retentions as opposed to distributed profits.
37

As was the case in Canada from 1949 to 1953.

38

Profit of 100, tax at 50% = tax of 50. Dividend of 50, tax at 50% = tax of 25, less

credit of (10% X 50) = 20. Total tax = 70.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 26 No. 3

important. 39 Suppose that Country A applies the classical system,
and Country B the imputation method; the tax rates are those given
in the above examples; a withholding tax of 15 percent is imposed
on dividends paid to non-residents; and the tax credit is restricted to
resident shareholders. In respect of dividends paid to residents of
Country B, Country A will collect 40 (corporate tax) plus 9
withholding tax = 49 total. By contrast, Country B will collect 50
(corporate tax) plus 7.5 withholding tax = 57.5 total. A reciprocal
system of withholding tax rates (as is normally provided in tax
treaties) will benefit those countries using imputation systems and
disadvantage foreign investors. 40 Such investors may also claim to
be discriminated against since, by being denied a dividend tax credit,
they are treated less favourably than domestic investors.4 1 Thus, the
United States claimed that its investors should also receive a credit
for tax paid by corporations in countries using the imputation system.
Those countries responded by pointing out that investors in
American corporations received no credit at all.
Canada, in the position of having to renegotiate its tax
treaties with the major participants in the dispute (France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United
States) found itself subjected to a number of conflicting pressures.
Within the European Community there were compelling reasons to
grant the credit to investors from other member states. France and
the United Kingdom were, in varying degrees, 4 2 willing to extend the
39

For full discussion, see M. Sato & R.M. Bird, InternationalAspects of t1e Taxation of
Corporations and Shareholders (Toronto:
University of Toronto, 1975); RJ. Vann,
"International Implications of Imputation" (1985) 2 Aust. Tax F. 451.
40

Thiis is a considerable oversimplification of what is, in practice, a very complex issue:

see Kingson, supra, note 34 at 1195ff.

41Most tax treaties contain a non-discrimination provision. For consideration of the
application of such a proviso to restrictions upon the dividend tax credit, see Vann, supra, note
39 at 468; J.G. O'Brien, 'The Nondiscrimination Article in Tax Treaties' (1978) 10 Law &
Pol'y Int'l Bus. 545; R.J. Patrick Jr., '"he Proposed Canada -- United States Income Tax
Treaty: Nondiscrimination, Mutual Agreement, and Exchange of Information" in Proceedings
of the 32nd Tax Conference -- 1980, supra, note 13, 735.
42

France grants the credit only in respect of portfolio investment, whereas the United

Kingdom also grants a partial credit in respect of direct investment: see Kingson, supra, note
34 at 1197.
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credit to investors from the United States and other countries;
Germany, 43 by contrast, was not, France and the United Kingdom
were prepared to allow the credit to Canadian investors, who,
naturally, had no wish to be treated less favourably than their
American counterparts. Just as naturally, however, the French and
British suggested that, if they extended their credits to Canadian
investors, Canada should give its credit to French and British
investors. This Canada was not prepared to do, for the simple
reason that it would make it considerably harder to resist demands
that Canada's dividend tax credit be extended to American investors.
This, indeed, was one of the main bones of contention in the
44
prolonged negotiations for the new treaty with the United States.
However much it would have liked to assist its investors in France
and the United Kingdom, the overwhelming consideration for
45
Canada must always be its position vis-ai-vis the United States.
Quite simply, Canada felt that it could not afford to extend the
dividend tax credit to u.s. residents and consequently could not allow
46
a credit to investors from other countries.
The eventual outcome was, ostensibly, highly satisfactory for
Canada. France 47 and the United Kingdom 48 were persuaded to

43
The Federal Republic of Germany substantially revised its corporation tax system in
1977, changing from a dual-rate system (retained profits taxed more heavily than distributed
profits) to one of virtually complete integration: see HJ. Ault & AJ. Ridler, T/he Gentan
Corporation Tar Refonn Law 1977 (Deventer Kluwer, 1976).
44
See especially Short, supra, note 13; Kingson, supra, note 34 at 1239, 1256; M. Burge
& R.D. Brown, "Negotiations for a New Tax Treaty between Canada and the United States - A Long Story" (1979) 27 Can. Tax J. 94.
45

In the words of Kingson, for Canada the treaty with the U.S. is "the treaty": supra, note
34 at 1256.
46

Sce Short, supra, note 13 at 412. Canada also attempted to justify its position by the
rather unconvincing argument that its system was not an imputation system like those in force
in European countries. It was (rightly) pointed out that the dividend tax credit does not
depend upon tax having been paid by the corporation and (more speciously) that the purpose
of the credit is not to relieve economic double taxation, but rather to promote investment by
Canadians in Canadian equities. Generally, see Brown, supra, note 5.
47

The new treaty with France was concluded in 1975; for comments, see Peterson, supra,
note 14.
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grant credits to Canadian investors without corresponding credits
being given by Canada, though those credits were less generous than
might have been obtained had Canada agreed to full reciprocal
treatment. At the same time, Canada finally succeeded, in 1980, in
negotiating a new treaty with the United States without yielding on
the dividend tax credit issue. In return, however, the United States
was able to persuade Canada to sacrifice its "sacred cow" - the
insistence upon a 15 percent rate of withholding tax on dividends
paid to non-residents. 49 In the case of dividends paid to affiliated
corporate shareholders the rate was reduced to 10 percent. Having
thus once abandoned its formerly firm stance on withholding tax
rates, Canada has subsequently found itself obliged to make similar
concessions to France,5 0 the Federal Republic of Germany, the
United Kingdom, 5 1 Japan, and, rather surprisingly, the People's
Republic of China.
The corporation tax issue has been emphasized here because
it illustrates a number of important factors that influence the
negotiation of international tax treaties. First, there is the rather
obvious point that changes in the domestic tax system frequently
have international repercussions, insofar as they also affect the
treatment of non-residents or of foreign-source income. Such
changes may alter a country's bargaining position with regard to the
negotiation of future treaties (and, as a general rule, it is
unfortunately true that the more harshly a country taxes foreign
investors or foreign-source income the better its bargaining position
becomes) and may necessitate the renegotiation of existing treaties.
Second, the existence of a tax treaty does not constitute a
guarantee that tax rules and burdens will not change. A treaty
provision which establishes a particular rate of tax to be charged on
dividends paid to residents of the other country does ensure that, so
48

The Canada-United Kingdom treaty was concluded in 1978: see N.J.S. Seed & D.G.

Pangbourne, 'The New Canada/U.K. Tax Convention: A Canadian Perspective" (1979) 27
Can. Tax J.17; V. Morgan, 'qhe New Canada-U.K. Protocol" (1985) 33 Can. Tax 3. 1216.
49See supra, note 25.
50

1n the new Protocol,signed in 1987.

51

In the 1985 Protocol; see Morgan, spra, note 48.
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long as the treaty remains in force and observed, that rate of tax will
not be exceeded; but it does not in any way guarantee that the
burden of tax upon the corporation paying those dividends may not
be increased. Consequently, the division of tax revenues agreed
upon by two
countries can be altered unilaterally by either one of
52
the parties.
Third, the normal principle adhered to in negotiating tax
treaties has been one of reciprocity. The corporate tax issue,
however, demonstrates that, where countries adopt different systems
of taxation, the traditional, mirror-image approach may not produce
the most appropriate or equitable result.53
Fourth, and this is perhaps the most significant lesson, a tax
treaty between two countries cannot simply be negotiated in
isolation. What Country A agrees to with Country B is likely to
affect what Country C will also expect of it. 54 Consequently, a
country may decline to negotiate the most mutually beneficial
arrangement in one treaty for fear that to do so might have a
'domino effect' and prejudice its position in future negotiations with
other countries. Particularly is this a problem for Canada, since it
is both a capital-exporting and a capital-importing nation and,
whatever its interests in relation to some other country may be, it
can never afford to ignore its position vis-?i-vis the United States.
The content of Canada's tax treaties, then, is determined and
52

We are not here concerned with the problem of altering the position of residents of

other countries by redefining terms employed in domestic legislation, which was considered

in the Melford case; see J. McCart & B. Morris, 'The Income Tax Act Conventions
Interpretation Act -- Unilateral Treaty Amendment?" (1983) 31 Can. Tax J. 1022; J.F. Avery
Jones et aL, 'The Interpretation of Tax Treaties with particular reference to Article 3(2) of
the OECD Model" [19841 Brit. Tax Rev. 14 at 90.
53

See R.A. Musgrave & P.B. Musgrave, Inter-nation Equity in R.M. Bird & J.G. Head,
eds., Modem FiscalIssues, Essays in Honor of CarlS. Shoup (Toronto: University of Toronto

Press, 1972) 63; Sato & Bird, supra, note 39.
54

A typical example of this phenomenon is Canada's reduction of the withholding rate

on dividends in the new (1980) treaty with the U.S.A., followed by similar concessions to a
number of other countries. It will be interesting to observe whether or not the reduction in
the withholding rate on interest payments, in the 1985 Protocol to the treaty with the United

Kingdom, will have similar repercussions: see Morgan, supra, note 48. Rather surprisingly,
the rate was not reduced in the new treaty with the Netherlands:
Canada-Netherlands Tax Treaty" (1986) 34 Can. Tax J. 872.

see V. Morgan, 'The New

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[,€oL, 26 No. 3

influenced not only by the changes which are made in domestic tax
legislation but also, and probably far more so, by what happens in
other countries of the world. The remainder of this paper will
examine some of the most significant external developments that
have occurred and have had an impact upon Canada's tax treaty
policy in the years since the Carter Report.
III. THE OECD MODEL TREATIES

Without doubt the greatest single influence upon tax treaty
policy, not only of Canada but of virtually all countries that have
entered the tax treaty arena, has been the model treaties formulated
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OE CD). 55 As has been remarked, "virtually all tax treaty negotiations
in the world today start with the OECD draft convention." It is true
that the United Nations Model 57 has had a considerable influence
upon, and is preferred by, many developing countries, but that model
itself is essentially a version of the

OECD

1977 Model, revised to meet

58
the particular needs of developing countries.
Various attempts had been made during the first half of this
century, particularly under the auspices of the League of Nations, to

'harmonize' the main provisions of bilateral tax treaties,5 9 but the

571963 Model, supra, note 15 and 1977 Model, supra, note 30.
56

G. Coulombe, "Certain Policy Aspects of Canadian Tax Treaties" in Proceedingsof the
28th Tar Conference -- 1976 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1977) 290 at 302. See also
R.A. Short, "Purposes and Effects of Income Tax Treaties" in Proceedings of the 24th Tax
Conference -- 1972, supra, note 27, 100 at 102.
571963 Model, supra, note 15 and 1977 Model, supra, note 30.
58
59

Treaties of developing countries are considered in the next Part of this paper.

A number of model conventions were put forward by League of Nations working
groups in 1927, 1928 and 1935: see D.M. Hudson & D.C. Turner, "International and
Interstate Approaches to Taxing Business Income" (1984) 6 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 562 at 567;
Rosenbloom & Langbein, supra, note 34 at 365. In 1943, in Mexico City, a model convention
drawn up by the Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations was adopted by representatives
of Canada, the U.S.A., and a number of Latin American countries: See K.C. Wang,
"International Double Taxation of Income: Relief through International Agreement" (1945)
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first model to gain really widespread acceptance was the OECD 1963
Model.60 At the time of the Royal Commission Report, the 1963
Model had been in existence for a relatively short time and had
influenced only the four most recent of Canada's tax treaties. 61 A
revised version was published in 1977, and it is this model that forms
the basis for some two-thirds or more of Canada's current treaties.
As the discussion of the corporation tax issue has illustrated,
each country, when it embarks upon the negotiation of a tax treaty,
normally has a list of the benefits that it hopes to extract from the
other country and a list of the concessions that it is prepared to
grant in return. In effect, it has its own 'model' treaty.62 Canada's
unofficial model may be said to be the OECD 1977 Model, with a
number of modifications or reservations. 63 The main reservations
are:
Withholding tax rates. Canada generally reserves the right to
impose a 15 percent withholding tax on dividends remitted abroad,

59 Harv. L. Rev. 73 at 95. This model was subsequently revised by the Fiscal Committee at
a meeting in London in 1946.
60

For commentary on the 1963 Model, see A.A. Kragen, "Double Income Taxation
Treaties: The O.E.C.D. Draft" (1964) 52 Cal. L. Rev. 306; M.B. Carroll, "International Tax
Law" (1968) 2 Int'l Law. 692. For a consideration of Canada's position with regard to the
1963 Model, see Short, supra, note 11 at 416; Short, supra, note 56 at 102; Peterson, supra,
note 14; Coulombe, supra, note 56.
61
Those with Japan (1964), Norway (1960), Ireland (1966), and Trinidad and Tobago
(1966). Of these, all but the one with Japan remain in force.
62

The United States is one of a very few countries to actually publish its own model tax
treaty. For comments, and comparison with the OECD 1977 Model, see M. Burge & D.G.
Broadhurst, "New U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty" (1982) 30 Can. Tax J. 76; Rosenbloom &
Langbein, supra, note 34; R.D. Klock, 'The Role of United States Income Tax Treaties: Two
Spheres of Negotiations" (1978) 13 Tex. Int'l LJ.387.
63

The OECD 1977 Model, supra, note 30, was accompanied by an extensive commentary.
In that commentary Canada, and the other OECD member countries, recorded a number of
"reservations" with respect to individual provisions. For consideration of Canada's reservations,
see Coulombe, supra, note 56; Peterson, supra, note 14; D.G. Broadhurst, "Income Tax
Treaties" (1978) 26 Can. Tax J. 217, 322, 575, 684.
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regardless of the degree of ownership by the recipient. 64 It further
reserves the right to tax interest payments at a rate of 15 percent 65
types of royalty payments at a rate of not less than
and to tax most
66
percent.
10
Capital gains. As previously mentioned,67 Canada exercises
a relatively broad jurisdiction in respect of capital gains realized by
non-residents disposing of property situated in Canada. Even in its
treaties, the policy is to reserve a right of taxation larger than that
envisaged by the OECD 1977 Model!68
Pensions. Again, Canada endeavours to retain a limited right
69
to tax at source pension payments made to non-residents.
Doubtless, this is due to the large number of Canadians who retire
to warmer climates and whose pensions are essentially a deferred
form of Canadian-source income.
Developing countries. In its treaties with developing
countries, Canada commonly adheres to a number of the positions
recommended in the United Nations Model treaty. These are
discussed in the next Part of this paper.
IV. TREATIES WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
As remarked in the Introduction, one of the most significant
developments since 1966, at least in relation to the geographical
scope of Canada's tax treaty network and the sheer number of

64The 1977 Model, ibid at art. 10, provides for a reduced rate of tax where dividends are

paid to a parent of an affiliated corporation. As seen above (notes 48-51 and accompanying
text), Canada relaxed its position in the new treaty with the U.S.A. and, subsequently, in its

tax treaties with a number of other countries.
65

Cf. ibid at art. 11.

66

Cf. ibid at art. 12. Certain types of royalty payment (e.g., authors' royalties) are
exempt, but this exemption does not extend to motion picture royalties.
67

See supra text accompanying note 30.

68Supra, note 30 at art. 13.
69

Cf ibid at art. 18.
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treaties entered into, has been the expansion of that network into
the Third World. In 1966, Canada had only one treaty with a
'developing' country70 - that with Trinidad and Tobago.7 1 In the
intervening years, treaties have been signed with Morocco, the
Dominican Republic, Liberia, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines,
Singapore, Jamaica, Korea, Indonesia, Barbados, Bangladesh,
Cameroon, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Brazil,
Thailand, Zambia, Guyana, India, and the People's Republic of
China. Treaties have also been concluded with Israel, Spain,
Romania, Cyprus, and Malta that accord those countries 'developing
country' treatment. In virtually all of these cases, Canada has made
special concessions.
Until the 1960s, practically all tax treaties had been between
the developed nations of western Europe, 72 North America and
Australasia. 73 Tax treaties with the developing countries of Africa
and Asia were few, except insofar as treaties made with the colonial
powers extended to them. 74 It was only then, of course, that most
of those countries acquired their independence and the power to
enter into their own treaties. But even so, there was no great
reason to rush into negotiating tax treaties. The typical tax treaty,

70The treaty of 1946 with the United Kingdom also applied to many British colonies.
It was terminated in 1965, and in 1966 replaced by a new treaty. The 1966 treaty did not
apply to those other countries, many of which had achieved independence since 1946.
71

The treaty with Trinidad and Tobago was signed in 1966. In some respects, Trinidad
and Tobago might be considered unfortunate to be the first developing country with which
Canada entered into a tax treaty. Subsequent Canadian tax treaties have generally been more
favourable to the developing country, and Trinidad and Tobago has also fared better with
other countries since 1966. It is interesting to note that Canada's treaty with Ireland, which
also dates from 1966, did provide for tax sparing in favour of Ireland. See Short, supra, note
5 at 38.
72

There were a few pre-war treaties involving eastern European countries.

See, infra,

note 119.
73

japan had also recently joined the 'tax treaty club'.

74See supra, note 70. The U.S.A. had many treaties with colonial and ex-colonial states,
through extensions of its treaties with Belgium (1948) and the United Kingdom (1945). These
were mostly terminated in 1983.
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as the Latin American countries had earlier realized, 75 was designed
to meet the needs of the developed nations, presumed complementary flows of income and capital, and was therefore based on principles of reciprocity. Its objective was to facilitate the international
movement of capital by eliminating double taxation, and the main
method of achieving this was by the elimination or reduction of
taxation in the country of source. This was all very well where
investment flowed in both directions. But where the flows were
essentially one-way, as in the case of the lesser-developed countries,
76
emphasis on residence-country taxation was evidently inappropriate.
Further, those developing countries that sought to attract foreign
investment by offering tax concessions frequently found their
of
concessions nullified, with the benefit accruing to the country
77
residence of the investor, rather than to the investor itself.
Initially, the developing countries did not appreciate the
disadvantages of the standard type of treaty that had come to be
employed by the developed nations. 78 Nor, in most cases, did they
appear to realize that they might have sufficient bargaining power to
secure a departure from the by then well-established model. In
many instances newly independent countries simply inherited treaties
that had been entered into by their former colonial masters, 79 and
the earliest post-independence treaties tended also to follow the
already well-established pattern. 8 0 Perhaps the developing countries,
cast in the role of supplicants for foreign aid and investment, saw
little opportunity to impose their own terms in negotiations with
developed countries. Gradually, however, circumstances began to
75

Notably at the time of the drafting of the 'Mexico Model' in 1943: see supra, note 59.

76

For a full discussion, see C.R. Irish, "International Double Taxation Agreements and

Income Taxation at Source" (1974) 23 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 292.
77By virtue of the operation of the foreign tax credit: this is discussed infra, notes 101-

104 and accompanying text.
78As mentioned above, the Latin American nations were an exception:

see text

accompanying note 75, supra.
79

See supra, notes 70 & 74.

80The Canada-Trinidad and Tobago treaty being a good example: see supra, note 71.
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change. Although it was true that there was competition among
developing countries to attract foreign investment, it also became
apparent that there was competition among developed countries, and
more particularly among enterprises from those countries, to secure
lucrative contracts in the developing world. Since the main purpose
of tax treaties has traditionally been to eliminate double taxation of
individuals and enterprises, and the division of tax revenue among
the contracting states has been only a secondary function, the chief
beneficiaries of any tax treaty with a developing country ought to be
the enterprises from developed countries investing or doing business
there. Such enterprises consequently had an incentive to exert
pressure upon their own governments to negotiate treaties with the
developing countries in which they sought to invest. This greatly
increased the bargaining position of the developing countries
themselves, 8 1 and once two or three developed countries were
prepared to accept terms more favourable to the developing
countries, 82 most of the others felt compelled to go along. In
reality, there was a sort of 'domino effect' in reverse: just as to
grant a special concession to one country causes others to expect the
same treatment, so to secure special treatment from one enables a
country better to extract the same treatment from others.
The special treatment now commonly requested by and
accorded to developing countries takes two basic forms: 8 3 an

81

Kenya, for example, cancelled (in 1973) the treaty arrangement that it had inherited
from the United Kingdom, and embarked upon a program of new negotiations: see Irish,
supra, note 76 at 299.
82
The Federal Republic of West Germany, Japan, and Sweden were among the first to
recognize the advantages of giving special concessions to developing countries. See M.B.
Carroll, "Germany, Japan and Sweden Show the United States How to Reach Tax Treaties
with South American Countries" (1969) 38 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 199; G. Bryan, "Developed
Nation Tax Law and Investment in LDC's" (1978) 17 Colum. J. Transnat'l L 221.
83

These are, of course, not the only concerns of developing countries. In particular,
many countries endeavour to secure favourable treatment for their students and teachers who
are training or doing research in developed countries: see Broadhurst, supra, note 63 at 689;
Klock, supra, note 62 at 416. China has been especially successful in this regard: see art. 19
of the Canada-China treaty in which, for the first time, Canada has been persuaded to omit
its usual proviso whereby it reserves the right to tax visiting students on income from
Canadian sources. China has secured similarly generous treatment from Belgium, France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Norway, and the United Kingdom.
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enlargement of source-country jurisdiction, and the preservation of
investment incentives by the process that has come to be known as
'tax sparing'.
A. Source-county Jurisdiction
Three basic methods exist whereby double taxation of income
flowing from one country to another may be avoided: the source
country may waive its right to tax, granting an exemption to residents
of other countries; the country of residence may exempt its own
residents from tax on foreign-source income;8 4 and both countries
may tax, but in such a way that the total tax burden is not increased.
Normally this third method is achieved by the country of residence
taxing foreign-source income but giving a credit for tax imposed
upon that income by the country of source.85 Considerations of
equity normally require that either the second or third method be
applied.86 Certainly, the Royal Commission had no doubt that
Canadian residents should be taxed on their world income 87 and that
"a buck is a buck," wherever it is earned. But if equity requires that
foreign-source income be included in the tax base, it also requires a
recognition of any tax that the income has borne in the country of
source: the total tax burden should be the same, whether one's
88
income derives from Kingston, Ontario or from Kingston, Jamaica.

84As does Canada in the case of dividends received by a Canadian corporation from an
affiliate in a "listed" country: supra, notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
85This is the method generally adopted in Canada (and in the U.S.A.), relief from double

taxation being given by means of a foreign tar credit: for a comprehensive study, see R.
Couzin, "he Foreign Tax Credit" in Proceedings of the 28th Tar Conference -- 1976, supra,
note 56, 69. The tax credit method does not always succeed in eliminating double taxation,

especially where the level of taxation is higher in the source country than in the country of
residence.
86

The first method may be appropriate, and convenient, in the case of corporations,

where progressive rates of tax generally do not apply and where the income will eventually be
taxed in the hands of the individual shareholders.
87

Report, supra, note 1 at 483, 491ff.

88

This also achieves what is generally referred to as "capital-export neutrality."

further R.M. Bird, "International Aspects of Integration" (1975) 28 Nat. Tax J. 302.

See
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This result can be, and commonly is, achieved unilaterally by
means of the foreign tax credit, but to be fully effective it is
normally necessary for host-country tax rates to be lower than the
average rate of tax payable by the recipient in the country of
residence.89 Consequently, one major objective when tax treaties are
negotiated is to reduce the level of source-country taxation to ensure
that double taxation will be fully eliminated, in particular by limiting
the rates of withholding tax applied to transfers of income. And
even where the foreign tax credit mechanism is successful in
eliminating double taxation, the added complexities of having to pay
tax in two jurisdictions and claim the appropriate credit may be a
deterrent to international commerce. It is consequently normal to
eliminate source-country taxation of income earned by non-residents
from what are essentially temporary or occasional activities. This is
achieved primarily by the 'permanent establishment' concept: 90 a
non-resident will be taxed on business income only if91he, she, or it
has a substantial connection with the source country.
These concepts and provisions work relatively well when
there is a more or less equal, two-way flow of income between the
contracting states. Indeed, in such circumstances it might be possible
to eliminate source-country taxation entirely. But where income
flows are essentially unidirectional, as is the case with the great
majority of developing countries, the restriction of source-country
jurisdiction simply operates to transfer revenue from the (usually
poor) host country to the (usually rich) country of residence.
Developing countries, consequently, have sought to expand
the scope of source-country jurisdiction beyond that provided for in
89

The foreign tax credit is normally restricted to the amount of tax that would otherwise

be payable in the country of residence in respect of the foreign-source income. Thus, Canada
restricts the amount to that of "Canadian tax otherwise payable" (CTOP): Income Tax Act,
supra, note 19 at s. 125. Without such a limitation there would, in effect, be a subsidy from

the residence country to the treasury of the source country. The operation of the limitation
is complex, and depends upon whether a per country limitation is employed (as in Canada),
or a global limitation (as in the United States). See further Couzin, supra, note 85.
90
See OECD 1977 Model, supra, note 30 at arts. 5, 7. The 'fixed-base' concept, ibid at
art. 14, serves a similar purpose for self-employed persons.
91
For a comprehensive study of the 'permanent establishment' rules in Canada's tax
treaties, see Broadhurst, supra, note 63 at 575.
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the OECD models;9 2 in doing so, they have generally found Canada
to be sympathetic and responsive. In part, no doubt, this can be
attributed to Canada's traditionally supportive attitude to the
developing world, but a more significant factor has probably been
the identity of Canada's own interests with those of developing
countries. In relation to the developing world, Canada is essentially
an exporter of capital, but in relation to more developed countries,
in particular the United States, Canada is on balance a capital93
importer, and has itself adopted a 'source-country mentality.'
Canada's willingness to accept an expanded source-country
jurisdiction is reflected in its treaties with developing countries in
two main respects. First, the definition of "permanent establishment"
is commonly expanded. For example, in the OECD 1977 Model,94 a
building site or construction project is treated as constituting a
permanent establishment only if it is in existence for a period of at
least a year; in Canada's treaties with developing countries this
period is almost invariably reduced to six months and, sometimes, to
as little as three months. 95 Canadian contractors carrying out
construction work in developing countries will consequently normally
pay tax on their profits to the host country. Another example is
provided by the treatment of insurance companies: in a number of
Canada's treaties, 9 6 the selling of insurance, even without the
establishment of a local office, is sufficient to render taxable the
profits of the insurer earned in the country of the insured.
The second, and probably more significant, method of
expanding source-country jurisdiction has been by means of
increasing rates of withholding tax. As has previously been observed,
Canada has generally advocated relatively high rates of withholding
92

Latin American countries, in particular, have traditionally adopted a strong 'source-

country' position: see Carroll, supra, note 82; Klock, supra, note 62 at 388.
93

See Kingson, supra, note 34 at 1170.

The same can be said of countries such as

Australia and New Zealand.
94 Supra, note 30 at art. 5.
95
96

E.g., in the treaties with India, Jamaica, Pakistan, and Zambia.
E.g., those with Barbados, Brazil, Indonesia, Jamaica, and Tunisia.
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tax, and recorded reservations to the OECD provisions on dividends,
interest and royalties, 97 preferring where possible to adhere to its
'15-15-15' model. In its treaties with a number of developing
countries Canada has gone further and has frequently agreed to
withholding tax rates in excess of 15 percent. Thus, for example, in
the treaty with the Dominican Republic, the standard withholding
rate is prescribed as 18 percent. In other treaties, rates on dividends
are stipulated to be 25 percent, 98 and, on some royalties, may be as
high as 30 percent. 99 More recently, Canada has been willing to
depart from the normal principle of reciprocity, and to accept the
levying of a higher withholding tax rate by the developing country
while restricting its own withholding tax to its normal "treaty" rate of
15 percent.100
B. Tax Sparing

Developing countries frequently seek to attract foreign
investment by offering tax concessions, such as accelerated
depreciation for capital investment and extended 'tax holidays' for
new ventures. Where the country of residence relieves double
taxation by means of an exemption for foreign-source income, such
tax concessions obviously benefit the taxpayer. 10 1 But where relief
is provided by means of a foreign tax credit, the real beneficiary of

97Supra, notes 64-66 and accompanying text. See also Broadhurst, supra, note 63 at 217.
98

E.g., the treaties with India and Kenya.

99

1n the treaty with India. The treaty with Brazil prescribes a rate of 25 percent for

some types of royalty payments, and that with Liberia, 20 percent. The Liberia treaty also
prescribes a 20 percent rate for interest.
10

Osee Coulombe, supra, note 56.

This is done, for example, in the treaties with

Cameroon, Egypt, the Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand.
101

This is the case in Canada, when a tax concession is enjoyed by a foreign subsidiary

in a "listed" country: any dividend paid out of active business income is received by the
Canadian parent as being from exempt surplus and is not subject to Canadian tax. See supra,
notes 18-19, and accompanying text; Coulombe, supra, note 56 at 299. Tax sparing in respect
of a subsidiary's profits is nevertheless valuable if those profits are not repatriated directly to

the Canadian parent, but are diverted through a holding company situated in a non-treaty
country.
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any tax concession by the host country will be the treasury of the
country of residence, unless 'tax sparing' is adopted.
For example, if a Canadian corporation carries on a business
in another country through a branch operation, it is taxable in
Canada on its profits earned by the branch, with a credit for the
tax paid to the other country in respect of those profits. If the
other country exempts those profits from tax, or reduces the normal
rate of tax thereon, the effect is simply to reduce the amount of
credit claimable against Canadian tax. It is consequently not the
corporation, but rather the Canadian government, that benefits from
the tax concession 02 In order to restore the benefit of tax
concessions, tax sparing is required: in effect, the country of
residence gives a foreign tax credit for the tax that would have been
paid to the host country if not for the host country's grant of relief.
A variant of this approach is provided by what is commonly, and
103
somewhat misleadingly, described as the 'matching credit' system.
As with tax sparing, a tax is deemed to have been paid to the host
country and to be creditable in the country of residence, but this
relief is not linked to any specific tax concession. For example, the
rate of withholding tax on dividends, interest or royalties may be
of the rate, if any, actually
deemed to be 20 percent, regardless
104
imposed in the source country.
102
The position is more complex in the case of operations conducted by a subsidiary
corporation: see ibid Initially, the tax relief will be enjoyed by the subsidiary. If the parent

corporation receives dividends from the subsidiary tax-free, then the benefit of the concession
is effectively transferred to the parent. If, however, the dividend constitutes taxable income
of the parent, with a credit for the underlying tax paid by the subsidiary, then ultimately the
beneficiary is the government of the parent's residence. However, if residence-country tax is
deferred until dividends are actually remitted, the corporate group continues to enjoy the
benefit of the concession during the period of deferral.

See S.S. Surrey, "International Tax

Conventions: How They Operate and What They Accomplish" (1965) 23 J. Tax. 364; Kingson,
supra, note 34 at 1262.
1 03

For an analysis of the different approaches to tax sparing, see H.W.T. Pepper et aL,

'Tax Relief Provisions between Developed and Developing Countries" (1972) 12 Eur. Tax. 1/3;
R.J. Vann and R.W. Parsons, 'The Foreign Tax Credit and Reform of International Taxation"
(1986) 3 Aust. Tax F. 131; Bryan, supra, note 82.
104

An interesting approach is that taken by the Federal Republic of Germany in some

of its treaties, in respect of dividends received from subsidiaries. The underlying tax that is
creditable against the dividend, is deemed to be the same amount it would be under German

law. Effectively this exempts the dividend from German tax: see K.C. Wrede, "Germany:
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At the time of the Royal Commission Report, none of
Canada's tax treaties contained tax-sparing provisionsO5 though the
Commission recognized the desirability of negotiating treaties with
developing countries and expressly accepted the concept of
sparing.10 6 This was then comparatively novel,10 7 but has since
become a common feature in treaties between developed and
developing countries, with the notable exception of the treaties of
the United States.1 0 8 Canada now routinely grants tax-sparing credits
in its treaties with developing countries. 1 9 Generally the relief takes
the form of a credit for tax waived or reduced under some specific
provision of the host country's legislation, normally in relation to
business profits. For example, in the recent treaty with the People's
Republic of China, 110 credit is given for tax that would have been
payable but for the operation of sections 5 and 6 of China's Joint
Venture Income Tax Law and sections 4 and 5 of its Foreign

Taxation of Foreign Source Income" [19841 Intertax 392.
105Canada's first treaty with a developing country was that with Trinidad and Tobago,
signed in 1966. The treaty contained no tax-sparing provision. However, a limited form of
tax sparing was provided in the treaty with Ireland, also signed in 1966: supra, note 71.
1 06

Reporn, supra, note 1 at 531.

1 07

It appears to have been pioneered by the Federal Republic of Germany and Sweden.

Provisions appear in the Germany-India and Sweden-Israel treaties, both of 1959: see further
the survey in Pepper et aL, supra, note 103.
1 08
Tax-sparing provisions were included in the draft treaties with India and Israel, but
were rejected by the U.S. Senate: see W.A. Slowinski, T.M. Haderlein & D.I. Meyer,
"International Tax Treaties: Where are we? -- Where are we going?" (1965) 5 Va. J.Int'l L.
133. Since then, the United States has refused to grant tax-sparing treatment. For reviews
of the U.S. position, see Surrey, supra, note 102; S.S. Surrey, "Factors Affecting U.S. Treasury
in Conducting International Tax Treaties" (1968) 28 J. Tax., 277; Kingson, supra, note 34;
Klock, supra, note 62; Rosenbloom & Langbein, supra, note 34.

109For a review, see N. Boidman, "Some Current Issues with Treaty Tax-sparing
Provisions" [1985] Bull. for Int'l Fisc. Doc. 387. Since 1975, the only exception appears to
be the treaty with Sri Lanka. There is, of course, no accepted definition of "developing":
Canada accords 'developing country' treatment to such countries as Israel, Romania, and
Spain, as well as Ireland, discussed supra, notes 71 & 105.
11 0

Treaty signed on May 12, 1986.
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Enteprise Income Tax Law.111 In a few instances, Canada has
adopted the matching credit method, 12 generally by deeming a tax
at the rate of 15 percent to have been withheld on dividends,
interest or royalties regardless of the rate, if any, actually withheld. 13
As already observed, with the exception of the United States,
tax sparing has become standard practice around the world and there
are even examples of countries that are both recipients and grantors
of tax sparing.11 4 In a number of instances tax sparing is provided
on a reciprocal basis,l11 which raises an interesting possibility. It is,
after all, not only developing countries that offer tax advantages and
holidays in order to attract or stimulate investment. In particular,
developed countries may quite legitimately do so in order to attract
investment in their less-developed regions. One may therefore ask
whether foreign enterprises, induced to invest in those regions,
should not also enjoy the benefit of tax concessions granted by the
host country, without having that benefit nullified by paying
correspondingly more tax in their countries of residence. There may,
indeed, be a case for a more generalized form of tax sparing.

111

1bid at art. 21. These provisions of the Chinese law provide 'tax holidays' for certain

types of new enterprises establishing themselves in China. See A. Easson & Li Jinyan,
'Taxation of Foreign Business and Investment in the People's Republic of China" (1986) 7
Nw. J. Int'l Law & Bus. 666.
112
Supra, note 104 and accompanying text. This method is favoured by most continental
European countries, especially in respect of rates of withholding tax. Those countries are

more inclined to exempt foreign business profits from tax, thus avoiding the need for tax
sparing.
11 3 See the treaties with Brazil and the Philippines.
receiving both types of credit.

China is particularly favoured,

114

Singapore receives tax-sparing treatment from the Netherlands, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom, and grants it to the People's Republic of China. Ireland and Spain have
frequently obtained tax sparing from more developed countries (as they do from Canada) and

they grant it to lesser-developed countries.
115

For example, in the Finland-Spain, Ireland-Zambia, Italy-Greece, and (curiously)
Romania-Sri Lanka treaties.
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V. TREATIES WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

As we have seen, until the 1950s, and in the case of Canada
until 1966, the tax treaty network was confined almost exclusively to
the relatively advanced, capitalist nations, most of which were
members of the OECD. The picture was altered dramatically by the
entry of the developing nations of Africa, Asia and the Caribbean
onto the international fiscal stage. A second major expansion of the
treaty network occurred, largely in the past decade, with the
conclusion of more than one hundred treaties by the socialist, or
'state trading', nations of eastern Europe and by the People's
Republic of China. 116 So far, Canada has been comparatively slow
to participate in this development, having treaties only with Romania
(1978), the USSR (1985) and China (1986).117
Tax treaties are not exactly a novelty for the countries of
eastern Europe. Indeed, Hungary was a party to what is generally
considered to have been the world's first income tax treaty,118 and
entered into a number of other treaties in the period prior to the
Second World War;119 the Soviet Union also concluded a tax treaty
with Germany in 1925. These early treaties apart, most of which
have long since ceased to be operative, the modern movement can

ll613y the end of 1986, Romania had entered into 22 bilateral tax treaties; Poland 17;
China and Hungary, each, 16; Czechoslovakia 15; Bulgaria 10; the German Democratic
Republic and Yugoslavia, each, 10; and the USSR, 8. Those countries, with the exception of
China and Yugoslavia, are also parties to two multilateral treaties adopted by members of the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). See infra, note 141 and accompanying

text.
117

Most active have been the countries of western Europe, notably Austria, Denmark and
Sweden, and (rather surprisingly) Cyprus. The United States (like Canada) has treaties with
Romania, the USSR, and China; and also with Hungary and Poland: see F.W. Brownell &
TJ. Johnson, 'Tax Conventions with Poland, Romania and the U.S.S.R." (1976) 8 Law & Pol'y
Int'l Bus. 763.
118

That of 1899, between Austria, Hungary, and Prussia.

119

For example, treaties with Czechoslovakia (1925) and Poland (1928), and a treaty with

Sweden (1936) that continued in force until replaced in 1982. For a review of Hungary's tax
treaties, see T. Nagy, 'Taxation of Individuals, Companies in the non-Socialist Sector and

Foreign Legal Entities" (1980) 20 Eur. Tax. 341.
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be said to have really begun with the conclusion of the treaty
between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1973.120 This
treaty is somewhat skeletal in nature, being considerably shorter than
the OECD models, and no doubt reflected the limited objectives of
the parties. At that time, the Soviet Union generally exempted from
income tax the income earned there by foreign nationals and (insofar
as they were permitted to exist at all) by foreign enterprises.12 1 By
contrast, its citizens employed in other countries were normally
taxable in those countries on income earned there and, as citizens,
were also taxable at home, without the benefit of any foreign tax
credit. The principal aim of the Soviet Union, consequently, appears
to have been to secure exemption from tax, or a reduction of tax,
for its citizens working (principally for state trading agencies) in the
United States. In this, they were only partially successful.1 22
Nevertheless, the treaty can be said to have given a signal to the
other countries of eastern Europe and to have paved the way for
the numerous subsequent treaties that have been concluded.
Prior to 1973 there was no real precedent for a tax treaty
between countries with market and non-market economies.1 23 Some
commentators took the view that the differences between the
economic and fiscal systems were such as to make the negotiation of
tax treaties impossible; others considered that these differences made
12 0

For comment, see Brownell & Johnson, supra, note 117; Doman, "East-West Tax
Treaties" (1982) 10 Int'l Bus. Law., 162. The U.S.-USSR treaty was, in fact, preceded by one
between the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland (1972); and Romania entered into
three treaties in 1973.
12 1

The Soviet tax reforms of 1978 introduced taxation of foreigners residing or doing
business in the USSR and brought the system closer to that of western nations. See J.E.
Martinez, "Soviet Personal Taxation of Foreigners" (1981) 19 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 445. For
a comprehensive review of taxation in the USSR, see M.A. Newcity, Taxation in the Soviet
Union (New York: Praeger, 1986).
12 2

A limited exemption for Soviet journalists was secured. Of the other countries with
which the USSR has concluded treaties, it appears that only Denmark has given a broad
exemption from tax for Soviet citizens working there. Canada does not even give the usual
exemption for journalists: see Newcity, ibid at 880. Another curiosity of the Canada-USSR
treaty is the provision dealing with directors' fees. There cannot be many Soviet citizens
directing Canadian companies, and at present it does not seem possible for a Canadian to be
a director of a Soviet company, at all.
12 3

See Brownell & Johnson, supra, note 117 at 770.
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treaties all the more necessary. 124 In any case, so long as western
countries had little investment in the countries of the socialist bloc,
and their own citizens were frequently exempt from tax there, there
was little incentive for the conclusion of tax treaties. The situation
changed dramatically as a result of the economic reforms carried out
in several of the eastern European countries from about 1968
onwards: doors were opened to foreign business and investment,
and tax systems were reformed along lines more familiar to western
eyes. 125 Much the same can be said of the economic reforms
introduced in China since 1978.126 In consequence, the treaties
entered into by socialist countries since 1973 have been able to
conform fairly closely to the OECD model. Unlike the developing
countries, the socialist countries have not been greatly concerned
with enlarging source-country jurisdiction; 127 presumably, with
currency and price controls available to them, they feel able to
ensure that they receive a fair share of any profits generated by
foreign investment. In particular, withholding tax rates tend to be
low and, in some cases, the tax is waived altogether.128 Especially
is this so with respect to withholding taxes on payments of interest,
where the objective of the socialist countries appears to be to
facilitate the negotiation of loans from western banks. In all, the
experience of the past decade or so suggests that the socialist

124J.S. Hausman, "Factors Affecting the Canadian Tax Treaty Network Since 1972" in
Proceedings of the 35th Tax Conference -- 1983 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1984)
589 at 597.
125

See Nagy, "Introduction to the Tax Systems of the Comecon Countries" (1982) 10 Int'l

Bus. Law. 156.
126

See Easson & Li, supra, note 111.

127

China is an exception, being a developing country as well as a socialist one. As

already observed (supra, notes 83, 111 & 113), in its treaty with Canada, China obtained tax
sparing and favourable treatment for its students. Romania has also been accorded tax
sparing in a number of its treaties, including the one it has with Canada.
128

For example, in the Austria-Bulgaria, Austria-USSR, Cyprus-Bulgaria, Cyprus-USSR
and Finland-Hungary treaties. Canada has preferred to retain its usual 15-15-15 rates

(Romania) or 15-15-10 (USSR), but has reduced its rates on interest and on intercorporate
dividends in its treaty with China:
(1986) 34 Can. Tax J. 1449.

see M. Jack, "Canada-China Double Tax Agreement"
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countries are eager to negotiate tax treaties with capitalist states and
that such treaties present no insurmountable difficulties.
VI. CURRENT TRENDS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
The final Part of this paper will briefly review a number of
other issues that can be expected to influence the tax treaty policy
of Canada, and of other countries, during the remainder of this century. No claim is made, however, to the possession of a crystal ball.
A. Expanding the Treaty Network
The tax treaty network, as we have seen, now extends to
most corners of the globe, and covers countries with a variety of
economic systems and in various stages of economic development.
Two areas of the world, however, have remained largely unaffected:
Latin America and the Middle East.
1. Latin America.
It is remarkable that the Carter Commission expressly singled
out, as countries with which Canada should soon negotiate tax
treaties, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela.1 29 Canada did conclude a
treaty with Brazil in 1984, but still has no treaty with Mexico or
Venezuela, nor with any other country of Hispanic America, apart
from the Dominican Republic.1 30 Indeed, Latin America has largely
stood aside from the tax treaty movement, ever since the failure to
gain general acceptance for the Mexico model treaty. 131 Brazil now
has a number of tax treaties, with Canada and western European

129Report, vol. 4, supra, note 1 at 569. See also Smith, supra, note 4 at 297, anticipating

new treaties with Latin American countries.
130

Canada's only South American tax treaty, apart from that with Brazil, is with Guyana.

131

Supra, note 59.
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countries, though not with the United States,13 2 and Argentina has
recently emerged onto the tax treaty stage 1 33 These apart, there
appear to be only two further examples - the treaty between Peru

and Sweden (1966) and the one between Ecuador and the Federal
Republic of Germany (1982).

Two main reasons for this dearth of treaties may be given.
First, the Latin American countries have traditionally asserted a

source-based tax jurisdiction and imposed high rates of withholding
tax.134 For the most part, they have not been prepared to reduce
source-country taxation to a level acceptable to the

OECD

member

states. Second, five countries are members of the Andean Pact.135
These countries have their own multilateral tax treaty, as well as an
agreed model treaty to be adhered to in conventions with nonmember states:
this model generally prescribes source-only
13 6
jurisdiction and is obviously unacceptable to most other countries.
2. The Middle East
The other area largely untouched by tax treaties is the
Middle East.1 37 With the exception of a number of treaties con-

132

For the history of the abortive negotiations between Brazil and the United States, see

Kingson, supra, note 34 at 1160, 1263; and Kock, supra, note 62 at 388, 396.
133

A treaty has been signed with the United States, but has not yet been ratified.

Argentina also has treaties with France and the Federal Republic of Germany.
1 34

Canada's treaty with Brazil permits certain royalty payments to be taxed at 25 percent.
It also contains the matching credit form of tax sparing, deeming tax to have been withheld
at a rate of either 25 or 20 percent. It is noteworthy that the Sweden-Peru treaty provides
for source-only taxation of dividends and interest.
135

The present members are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.

Chile

was an original member, but left in 1977.
136

For commentary on the multilateral treaty and the model treaty, see E. Piedrabuena,
'The Model Convention to Avoid Double Income Taxation in the Andean Pact" [1975] 29
Bull. for Int'l Fist. Doe. 51; R. Vald~s Costa, "The Treatment of Investment Income under
the Andean Pact Model Convention - The Andean View" [1975] 29 Bulletin for Int'l Fis. Doc.
91.
13 7

Apart from Egypt and Israel, both of which have a substantial number of tax treaties.
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1 38
cluded by France and one by the Federal Republic of Germany,
the only treaties in this area .are somewhat curious: those between
Cyprus and Kuwait,139 Libya and Malta,1 40 and Jordan and Romania.
The willingness of the more developed countries to accept an
expanded source jurisdiction on the part of developing nations would
suggest that satisfactory compromises could be arrived at to bring the
countries of Latin America into the treaty network, especially since
Argentina and Brazil are now pointing the way. As to the Middle
East, flows of income have in recent years become increasingly twoway, which should make the conclusion of tax treaties mutually
attractive.

B. MultilateralConventions
Mention has been made of the multilateral tax treaties
entered into by the member countries of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CMEA), and of the Andean Pact. The CMEA
treaties141 are largely concerned with the activities of state-trading
agencies and their employees in the territories of other member
states, and emphasize taxation on the basis of residence, with
widespread exemptions for non-resident individuals and corporations.
The Andean treaty,1 42 by contrast, provides principally for taxation
in the country of source.
138

France has treaties with Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia.

The

Federal Republic of Germany also has a treaty with Iran.
139
Cyprus, as has already been seen, has been especially active in concluding treaties with
the countries of eastern Europe: see W.G. Kuiper, "Cyprus: Turntable Between East and

West" (1984) 24 Eur. Tax. 175.
140

See E.A. Vella, 'Treaty Shopping in Unexpected Quarters" [1987] Bull. for Int'l Fisc.

Doc. 75.
14

1
The treaties of Miskolc (1977) and Ulan Bator (1978), concerning respectively the
avoidance of double taxation of the income and assets of individuals, and of legal entities.

The signatory states are Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary,
Mongolia, Poland, Romania, and the USSR. For commentary, see Newcity, supra, note 121
at 887; J. Gluchowski, "International Taxation Agreements of the Polish People's Republic with
the Eastern and Western Countries" (1984) 13 Polish Y.B. Int'l L. 135 at 141ff.
1 42

Signed in Lima, 1971. See supra, notes 135-36.
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Both of these treaties have rather special features and would
not appear to be adaptable to the international community at large.
Of greater interest and potential is the Nordic Convention,143 since
the economic and fiscal systems of the signatory states, and the
provisions of the Convention, adhere more closely to generally
accepted international norms. This has led some commentators 44
to suggest that the Nordic Convention might serve as a model for
the future, with a single multinational convention replacing many of
the existing bilateral arrangements. As has been pointed out, the
twenty-four members of the OECD have concluded, in all, well over
200 tax treaties among themselves, nearly all of them based closely
upon the OECD models. 145 However, even the Nordic Convention
proved difficult to negotiate and fails to provide uniform solutions
to all of the problems. At present, therefore, a broader multilateral
convention, even if restricted to OECD members, seems a very distant
prospect.
The situation might change, however, if the member states
of the European Community were to conclude a tax convention, as
envisaged by article 220 of the EEC Treaty.146 The feasibility of such
a convention has been studied from time to time, but progress has
been minimal. The conditions for the adoption of a convention
would, however, become far more favourable if the various proposals
for directives to harmonize the systems of direct taxation were to be

143
Signed in Helsinki in 1983. The member states are Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway, and Sweden. An earlier (1972) convention provided for reciprocal administrative

cooperation among the tax officials of those states.
14 4

N. Mattsson, "Is the Multilateral Convention a Solution for the Future? Comments

with Reflection to the Nordic Experience" [1985] Intertax 212; H.M.A.L. Hamaekers,
"Multilateral Instruments on the Avoidance of Double Taxation" [1986] Bulletin for Int'l Fisc.
Doc. 99. See also A. Knechtle, Basic Problems in InternationalFiscal Law, trans. W.E.
Weisflog (Deventer. Kluwer, 1979) c. 14.
145

Hamaekers, ibid at 99.

146

See Easson, supra, note 33 at 193.
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adopted, in particular those concerning the taxation of corporate
profits and distributions,
and the tax treatment of parent-subsidiary
14 7
relationships.
C. Treaty Shopping and Treaty Abuse
As has been seen, tax treaty provisions vary widely from one
country to another and, despite the fact that many countries have
their own model treaties to be adhered to wherever possible, no two
treaties entered into by the same country are quite identical. This
factor, combined with the comparative ease with which a corporation
can be established in most countries, 148 has led to the development,
particularly over the past twenty years, of new and sophisticated
methods of tax planning. The tax haven pure and simple (though
these may not be the most appropriate adjectives) still has its uses,
but countries are increasingly adopting anti-haven rules. 149 The taxplanning focus has consequently shifted, and great emphasis has been
placed upon the search for favourable treaty provisions, or a
combination of provisions, and the use of 'stepping stones' for
shifting income from its source to its ultimate destination. One of
the best known examples, until recently, involved income flowing by
the route United States-Netherlands Antilles-Netherlands-Canada,

14 7

Two proposed directives (on mergers and on parent-subsidiary relationships) were

submitted by the Commission of the European Communities to the Council of Ministers in

1969, and a further proposal, on corporation tax systems, was submitted in 1975.

The

proposals have subsequently been substantially amended, but do not appear likely to be

adopted in the near future.
148

'Treaty shopping' is not confined to cases where corporations are employed. One of

the earliest recognized instances occurred in Johansson v. United States (1964), 336 F.2d. 809
(5th Cir.). In that case, an American court refused to recognize Mr. Ingemar Johansson, the

Swedish former world champion heavyweight boxer, who had earned large sums winning, and
then losing, his title in the U.S.A., as a resident of Switzerland, and his claim to rely upon the

Switzerland-U.S.A. tax treaty was rejected. See Slowinski, Haderlein & Meyer, supra, note 108
at 142.
149

Such as the FAPI (Foreign Accrual Property Income) rules in Canada, or the U.S.
"Sub-part F' rules.
See further B.1. Arnold, "The Taxation of Controlled Foreign
Corporations: Defining and Designating Tax Havens" (1985) 33 Can. Tax J. 445.

1988]

Evolution

rather than flowing directly from the United States to Canada.150
Commonly, 'stepping stones' are employed to take advantage of
lower rates of withholding tax, or to change the nature of a
particular source of income (for example, to convert royalties or
interest into dividends); occasionally advantage may also be taken of
some particular feature, such as the special treatment of a Swiss
151
partnership, a Danish cooperative, or a Cypriot offshore company.
Sophisticated treaty-shopping practices have had two major
effects upon tax treaty policy. First, there have been created a
number of new types of tax haven. Unlike the classic fiscal paradise,
typically a small island with a warm climate where no one pays tax
at all, and which consequently has no tax treaties, the modern haven
for the most part charges normal rates of income tax but offers one
or more special advantages combined with an extensive network of
tax treaties. Thus, for example, the treaty network that Cyprus has
established with eastern European countries provides for exemption
from, or low rates of, withholding tax on dividends, interest and
royalties. This, in combination with its own generous treatment of
foreign-owned companies established in Cyprus, would seem to make
Cyprus an attractive stepping stone for corporations from other
countries with which Cyprus has a tax treaty, wishing to do business
152
in eastern Europe.
150A variety of techniques have been used, often referred to by colourful names
such as
the "Antilles Loop," "Dutch Treat," "Dutch Sandwich," and so on. In the past four years the
United States has renegotiated its treaties with the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles;
the arrangement between the Antilles and the Netherlands has been revised; and the treaty
between Canada and the Netherlands has been renegotiated: see V. Morgan, 'The Pending
Canada-Netherlands Tax Treaty: The Dutch Treat is Over" (1984) 32 Can. Tax J. 760; 'The
New Canada-Netherlands Tax Treaty" (1986) 34 Can. Tax J. 872; JJ.O.M. Vermeer,
"Netherlands Holding Companies and the New Canada-Netherlands Income Tax Convention"
in Proceedingsof the 37th Tar Conference -- 1985 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1986)
22:1. The Netherlands Antilles were also popular for other purposes, eag., to invest in real
estate in the United Kingdom: see R. Moore, "Sunset over the Antilles" (1986) 26 Eur. Tax.
325.
151

See the examples given by M. Grundy, The World of InternationalTax Planning(New
York: Cambridge University, 1984) 71ff.
152

See Kuiper, supra, note 139. Cyprus and Malta also appear to offer openings to some
countries of the Middle East. See Vella, supra, note 140. Judging from their rather curious
treaty networks, one suspects that Romania and Sri Lanka are up to something. Could
Romania become the first tax haven in the communist world?
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Second, this practice of treaty shopping has led in turn to
attempts to prevent 'treaty abuse' and undue tax avoidance. The
United States, which has probably suffered the greatest revenue
losses as a result of treaty shopping by its own multinational
corporations, has been especially active in seeking to control such
abuse, exerting considerable pressure upon some of its treaty
partners (notably the Netherlands Antilles, the Netherlands and
Switzerland) to renegotiate existing treaties in order to close
loopholes and prevent further tax avoidance 5 3 and, where this has
failed, renouncing certain of its treaties unilaterally.1 5 4 A new
provision 5 5 has also been included in the United States' own model
tax treaty, the general intent of which is to restrict treaty shopping
by restricting the benefit of the treaty to what might be considered
to be genuine residents of the other country.15 6 Not surprisingly,
what happens in the United States almost inevitably has its
repercussions in Canada. In order to further its own policies - and,
in the present case, the legitimacy of these is not in question - the
United States seeks to influence Canada's position vis-Li-vis other
countries, and the position of those countries vis-ti-vis Canada.
Thus, for example, the treaty renegotiations between Canada and the
Netherlands could not but be influenced by the renegotiations that

15

3
See Kingson, supra, note 34 at 1276; Rosenbloom & Langbein, supra, note 34 at 395.
A new treaty between the Netherlands Antilles and the United States was signed in 1986 and
contains a unique treaty-shopping article. There may still, however, be advantages in forming
a Netherlands Antilles subsidiary or holding company: see S.A. Nauheim & H.H. Jacobson,
"Proposed United States-Netherlands Antilles Income Tax Treaty: New Opportunities for
Foreign Investment in U.S. Real Estate" (1986) 15 Tax Mgmt. Int'l J. 462.

1 5 4 See P.T. Kaplan, "Reasons, Old and New, for the Erosion of United States Tax

Treaties" [1986] Brit. Tax Rev. 211 at 225.

The U.S. Congress has also expressed a

willingness to enact treaty 'overrides' (ia, to enact legislation that expressly prevails over a

conflicting provision in an existing treaty) unless the treaty in question contains adequate
provision to prevent treaty abuse: ibid. at 214.
155Art. 16 of the revised U.S. Model treaty: see M. Burge and D.G. Broadhurst, "New
U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty" (1982) 30 Can. Tax J. 76 at 80.
15 6 The most drastic provision relates to holding or investment companies. The United

States seeks to deny the benefits of the treaty to these companies where more than 25 percent
of shares are owned or controlled by non-residents of the other country. While preventing
some common abuses, this provision would also hit at the activities of legitimate joint

ventures.
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D. InternationalCooperationagainstAvoidance and Evasion
International tax avoidance and evasion, and the problems
158
caused by transfer-pricing practices by multinational enterprises,
have also become of increasing concern in recent years. Originally,
the primary function of tax treaties was accepted to be the elimination of double taxation; nowadays, the elimination of tax evasion

appears to be a consideration of at least equal importance to the
governments that negotiate the treaties. In this respect, Canada and
the United States have taken the lead, establishing comprehensive

procedures for the exchange of information and for conducting joint
or simultaneous audits and investigations of taxpayers, 159 and

providing a mutual agreement procedure for resolving transferpricing disputes. 160 The European Community has also been active,
adopting two directives dealing with exchange of information
and
161
mutual cooperation to prevent tax avoidance and evasion.

15 7

See Hausman, supra, note 124; Vermeer, supra, note 150.

158J.S. Peterson, "International Transfer Pricing: A Canadian Perspective" in Proceedings
of the 31st Tax Conference - 1979 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1980) 451; D.A.
Ward, "Pricing and International Transactions' in Proceedings of the 28th Tax Conference -1976, supra, note 56, 130 at 135.
15 9
See J.A. Calderwood, "A Revenue Canada Perspective on the Role and Method of
Operation of the 'Competent Authority' in Proceedings of the 36th Tax Conference -- 1984
(Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1985) 315; D.P. Curtin, "Exchange of Information under
the United States Income Tax Treaties" (1986) 12 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 35; R.D. Brown,
"International Tax Audits: Wave of the Future, or Deluge for Taxpayers?" (1977) Can. Tax
J.528; S.H. Goldberg, "Competent Authority' [1986] Bull. for Int'l Fisc. Doc. 431.
16 0

See Ward, supra, note 158; Goldberg, supra, note 159, J.A. Guttentag & A.E. Misback,
"Resolving Tax Treaty Issues: a Novel Solution" (1986) Bull. for Int'l Fisc. Doc. 350. More
than half of all requests for "competent authority" reviews in the United States involve Canada,
and more than 80 percent of Canadian cases concern the United States. Goldberg, ibid at
439.
161
See Easson, supra, note 33 at 201. See also the proposed directive on transfer pricing,
ibid at 194.
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E. Unitay Tax
One of the issues that complicated the renegotiation of the
Canada-United States treaty,162 and relations between the United
States and other countries generally, was the introduction by a
number of the states, most notably California, of the unitary system
of taxing corporate income. This system, essentially, combines two
theories: an enterprise that carries on business in a number of
jurisdictions should have its profits allocated among those
jurisdictions according to an appropriate formula,1 63 and where a
number of corporations are related and effectively form part of a
group, that group should be regarded, for the purposes of the
apportionment, as constituting a single enterprise. Both propositions
seem eminently reasonable, at any rate if the formula adopted to
apportion income is a fair and proper one.164 Administratively,
however, the system turned out to be something of a nightmare, with
large multinational corporations having to produce accounts for
numerous subsidiaries around the globe. 165 Pressure was brought
upon the United States by a number of countries currently engaged

162
See R.D. Brown, "Canada-US. Tax Issues: the Tax Treaty, Unitary Taxation, and the
Future" (1984) 32 Can. Tax J. 547; Burge and Brown, supra, note 44 at 100.
163

Rather than by seeking to identify each item of income with a particular source.
Formula apportionment is already widely used in the case of single corporations, e.g., among
the states of the U.S.A. and among the provinces of Canada. See further R.M. Bird & D.S.
Brean, 'The Interjurisdictional Allocation of Income and the Unitary Taxation Debate" (1986)
34 Can. Tax J. 1377; P.B. Musgrave, 'Tax-Base Shares: The Unitary Versus Separate Entity
Approaches" in Proceedings of the 31st Tax Conference -- 1979, supra, note 158, 445.
16 4
The formulae are usually based upon weighting of turnover, assets and payroll. It is
clear that the weighting can be manipulated to maximize revenue. E.g., a jurisdiction with high

wage rates may attach extra weight to payroll. Consequently, if formulae vary from one
jurisdiction to another, there may be over- or under-taxation.
165
1n the case of the Shell group and its California subsidiary Scallop Nuclear Inc., the
income of some nine hundred affiliated corporations was apportioned. Almost as complex
were the affairs of Alcan. See K. Kooijman, "Unitary Taxation - A Corporate Experience"
[1984] Intertax 412; M.P. McAllister, 'The Controversy over World-wide Unitary Taxation:
Legal, Economic and Political Implications" (1985) 9 Suffolk Transnat'l LJ. 265; K. Schlenger,
"State Worldwide Unitary Taxation: The Foreign Parent Case" (1985) 23 Colum. J. Transnat'l
L. 445.

Evolution

1988]

535

in treaty renegotiations 166 to persuade the offending states to at least
exempt foreign multinationals from the scope of the unitary tax
system and, though the issue is not fully resolved, there does appear
to have been a retreat, on the part of most states, to the "water's
edge".167 The experience with unitary taxation has perhaps been an
unfortunate one, since in many respects the system affords a preferable alternative to the present one, whereby profits of multinational
enterprises have to be allocated to, and identified with, branches or
establishments in the various countries where operations are
conducted. In addition, unitary taxation eliminates most of the
problems associated with transfer pricing and might well provide a
suitable basis for a future multilateral tax convention.
F. Tax Refonn
The initial theme of this paper was to consider the
consequences, for Canada's tax treaty policy, of the recommendations
of the Carter Commission and of the tax reforms subsequently
adopted in the light of those recommendations. One conclusion to
emerge from this examination has been that a reform of a country's
domestic tax system will almost inevitably have an impact upon its
international position, frequently necessitating the renegotiation of
its existing treaties and generally affecting its bargaining position in
future negotiations. 16 At the same time, while the process of
reform is actually under way, the surrounding uncertainty makes
negotiation difficult and frequently delays the conclusion of tax
treaties.
The other broad conclusion to emerge is that we live in an
increasingly interdependent environment. Certainly a country like
1 66

Notably Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom
went so far as to enact retaliatory legislation: See Schlenger, ibid at 466ff.
1 67

See Bird & Brean, supra, note 163.

1680f recent tax reforms, those in Australia have probably had the most far-reaching
international consequences. See Vann & Parsons, supra, note 103 at 144, 211; R. Krever, 'Tax
Reform in Australia: Base-Broadening Down Under" (1986) 34 Can. Tax J. 346. By contrast,
the reforms proposed for Canada in June, 1987 would seem to have a lesser impact on the

international scene.
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Canada cannot unilaterally pursue either a domestic or an
international tax policy. Obviously, as the Carter Commission itself
recognized, Canada must always keep at least one eye upon what is
happening in the United States, and American positions or trends
may well have an influence upon Canada's relationships with other
countries - a typical example being the renegotiation of the treaty
with the Netherlands. But what happens elsewhere may also have
a ripple effect. Thus, corporate tax reforms in France and the
United Kingdom affected Canada's relationship with the United
States, and a tax-sparing provision in a treaty between the Federal
Republic of Germany and India began a trend that has been reflected in close to a thousand tax treaties since then. It seems that it
is no longer possible to separate the purely domestic from the
international aspects of tax reform: taxation has, indeed, become a
truly international subject.

